FEMA, Fires, and the Project
Very few Americans began 2025 assuming it would be an uneventful year, but it’s doubtful anyone predicted that January would begin with the obliteration of multiple neighborhoods in Los Angeles. Donald Trump, Mike Johnson, and Elon Musk are not the first evil villains of the new year—that honor goes to the Santa Ana winds, the increasingly dry conditions of the American Southwest, and a century of civil development that has attempted to tame Nature rather than adapt to it.
As the federal executive transitions from the Biden Administration to the second Trump Administration, bolstered by Republican control of both houses of Congress, the 2025 LA fires will give the first indication of how the ambitious Republican leadership intends to respond to emergency scenarios, especially emergencies that affect individual states or local jurisdictions. With regard to granting emergency relief aid to California, House Speaker Mike Johnson has opined, “I think there should probably be conditions on that aid.” Senate Majority Whip John Barrasso (WY) said, “I expect there will be strings attached to money that is ultimately approved.” Both referred to—in their opinions—failures of state and local government, and in Barrasso’s case, readiness for future emergencies.
Bluster is not unexpected. The state of California is a perennial bogeyman for conservative priorities and a punching bag for the conservative press. Whether these statements are just bluster is yet to be determined, as the disdainful rhetoric coming from conservative lawmakers does obliquely reflect intentional conservative policy agenda. Project 2025 explicitly addresses the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and other grant-making entities that fall under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). FEMA is a primary outlet for disbursement of disaster relief funds. Biden has already made aid available to California through FEMA by declaring the Los Angeles fires a “major disaster” and directing the federal government to cover up to 100% of costs for a period of time. The latest stopgap spending bill approved by Congress included $100 billion in additional disaster relief air, including $29 billion for FEMA.
It is unclear whether California will require additional Congressional appropriations to meet their disaster needs. Regardless, if the new executive administration uses Project 2025 as a guide, its response to California requests could be much different than that of the Biden Administration. There are two key aspects to the changes Project 2025 wants to make to FEMA*, both of which are highly significant to the current situation in Los Angeles.
First, Project 2025 promotes the spirit of federalism when it comes to granting relief to states and local entities: “Reform of FEMA requires a greater emphasis on federalism and state and local preparedness, leaving FEMA to focus on large, widespread disasters” (MFL** pg. 153). It suggests raising the per-capita threshold for assistance, applying deductibles, and adjusting the cost-share arrangement so that the federal government covers less—including only 25% for small disasters (MFL pg. 153). The Stafford Act mandates that this assistance is generally 75%, so cost-sharing changes would require congressional approval. That said, the Trump Administration would have some leeway in how they categorize costs among the different FEMA grant programs, which have different cost-sharing requirements, and whether to reimburse above the mandated 75%, as Biden has directed.
The second key policy goal of Project 2025 regarding FEMA and DHS grants in general is to require all state and local entities receiving government funds to comply and cooperate with DHS efforts to reduce illegal immigration and deport undocumented immigrants currently living in the United States. Specifically, it states that:
“The Secretary should direct FEMA to ensure that all FEMA-issues grant funding for states, localities, and private organizations is going to recipients who are lawful actors, can demonstrate that they are in compliance with federal law, and can show that their mission and actions support the broader homeland security mission. […] Such preconditions should include at least the following:
Certification by applicants that they comply with all aspects of federal immigration laws, including the honoring of all immigration detainers.
Certification by applicants that they are both registers with E-Verify and using E-Verify in a transparent and nonevasive manner. For states and localities, that would include certification that all components of that government, and not just the applicant agency, are registered with an use E-Verify.
If the applicant is a state or locality, commitment by that state or locality to total information-sharing in the context of both federal law enforcement and immigration enforcement. This would include access to department of motor vehicles and voter registration databases” (MFL pgs. 137-138).
Although immigration reform that includes a crackdown on illegal immigration has bipartisan support, there are still major differences in how the two parties would execute this reform, especially in how state and local governments would be forced to assist. It’s reasonable to assume that any self-declared “sanctuary city”—a designation LA just adopted at the end of 2024—would not qualify for aid under this criterion without drastic changes in local policing and detention policies. Project 2025 makes this explicit by proposing that “Congress should require compliance with immigration detainers to the maximum extent consistent with the Tenth Amendment and set financial disincentives for jurisdictions that implement either official or unofficial sanctuary policies” (MFL, pg. 150).
One consideration of cold practicality is that the rebuilding of the destroyed LA neighborhoods will require considerable labor. The construction/contractor labor force—for better or worse—is notably buoyed by illegal immigration. Forcing LA to prioritize detaining those suspected of immigrating illegally could chill their most essential labor market for recovery.
Project 2025 is well aware of the single major hurdle these disaster relief policy goals will face: “Accomplishing this, however, will require action by Members of Congress who repeatedly vote to fund grants for political reasons” (MFL pg. 154).
California may have Democratic leadership, but it is also home to more Republicans than any other state, and the many Republican House Representatives from California districts are critical to any hope of retaining a Republican majority in the House. These Republican representatives are unlikely to quietly stand by if CA is forced to bear more disaster costs than would be expected of other states. Whether or not the political movement behind Project 2025 can convince other Republican politicians (including Trump) to promote conservative policy goals at the expense of their constituents will be a high-visibility indication of how influential the Project 2025 movement will be within the Trump Administration and the Republican-led legislature.
On another note…
The implication for distribution of disaster relief is not the only way these 2025 LA fires intersect with goals outlines in Project 2025, which does address the need for forest management reform with regard to wildfire risk. Specifically, it calls to “reduce regulatory obstacles to reducing fuel buildup and increase timber sales” (MFL pg. 308).
Reducing available fuel is an effective recommendation for preventing forest fires. It is not surprising to see a group of conservative policy analysts and lawmakers focus on benefits for timber sales, but both parties are in favor of reform. There is, in fact, a bipartisan bill in the House, H.R. 8790, the Fix Our Forests Act, that would serve to achieve this goal of Project 2025. It would ease restrictions around forest thinning (especially by reducing NEPA requirements), whether by mechanical thinning, prescribed burning, or grazing, in designated fireshed areas.
A similar bill has been put forth in the Senate by John Barrasso (WY), albeit with only Republican cosponsors at the moment. A primary difference between the two is that Barrasso’s bill would give more power to the Interior Secretary in deciding how much land is available for lessened-restrictions on thinning, while the House bill relies on U.S. Forest Service research studies to designate firesheds.
*Project 2025 actually suggests completely dismantling DHS and moving its constituent agencies to other departments, including FEMA to either the Department of Interior or of Transportation. Recognizing this heavy political and procedural lift, it also suggests changes to DHS as it currently exists.
**MFL = Mandate for Leadership (the Project 2025 policy directive).